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Interfor International‘s Weekly Security Digest - April 9, 2024

Interfor International‘s Weekly Security Digest – April 9, 2024

Global Security Matters

Iran and its Proxies

  • Israeli and US officials are bracing for Iran’s retaliation after the strike on its diplomatic building in Damascus last week. After more than a week, there is growing uncertainty and speculation surrounding Iran’s possible response and where it might occur. Top Iranian officials have vowed to respond but the regime has yet to strike. Israel carried out various strikes on Iranian assets in Syria and Lebanon in the past, but the targeting of a diplomatic building marks a significant escalation. If Iran is to respond in kind by targeting Israelis abroad, or worse, by striking Israel directly, the risk of regional war will increase.
    • Interfor Analysis: The two likeliest scenarios for an Iranian response are: 1) A direct Iranian military strike on Israeli assets abroad, likely diplomatic facilities; or 2) Targeting of Israel directly using proxy forces (most likely Hezbollah).
    • A CBS report late last week indicated that US intelligence and defense officials viewed an Iranian military strike as the most likely response, rather than a proxy-led initiative. This report did not include insight into targeting. Still, Interfor assesses that Iran does not want all-out, direct war with Israel and/or the US, which should preclude a direct Iranian military attack on Israel proper, leaving a direct military attack on Israeli interests abroad as the more probable scenario.
    • The above notwithstanding, much could continue to rest on the prospects of the Gaza ceasefire talks. If Israel and Hamas were to achieve a ceasefire this week, for example, an Iranian attack on/against Israel would suddenly seem out of place. Such an attack would suddenly be perceived as aggression and escalation, rather than a response to an aggressive Israeli posture. In that case, we might see Israel-Iran tensions recede into the background, where they were before the current Gaza conflict, with Iran responding to the Damascus strike more covertly and/or on a more open-ended timeframe.
  • Jaish al-Adl, a separatist ethnic Baluch group formerly known as Jundallah, attempted to take over IRGC military bases, killing 10 and injuring dozens. Jaish al-Adl claimed 168 of its fighters took part in the attack in a push to claim territory in Sunni-majority areas of Iran. Clashes in this area are fairly frequent, as ethnic and religious minorities in Iran have long accused Tehran of systematic oppression. However, on the heels of Israel’s airstrike on the Iranian diplomatic building in Damascus, such domestic instability is likely to see an even harsher response than in normal times.
    • Interfor Analysis: It’s also worth noting that Iran has historically accused Israel (and less frequently the US) of supporting Jundallah. Those accusations have resurfaced amid the recent spate of Jaish al-Adl attacks targeting the IRGC in southeastern Iran. Jaish al-Adl, in recent attacks, has demonstrated increased brazenness, but it is still primarily a regional extremist group that can only marginally upset the stability of the Islamic Republic.
  • Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, called for an end to Iran’s meddling in Palestinian affairs. In a statement released last week, Abbas accused Tehran of exploiting Palestinians and the war in Gaza to advance its own geopolitical goals. This direct critique of Iran follows Abbas’ past criticism of Hamas. In March, Abbas called Hamas’ attack on Israel and the destruction thereafter a worse “catastrophe” for Palestinians than the 1948 establishment of the state of Israel.
    • Interfor Analysis: Such statements may be a strategic move by Abbas to position the PA as the best alternative to lead in Gaza once Israel withdraws. Israel has maintained a relationship of necessity with the PA for much of the last 15 years. As pressure mounts to put an end to the war in Gaza, a pact to counter Israel and the PA’s mutual enemies may lead to greater, if cautious, cooperation between the two governments.
    • Abbas is also likely posturing against Iran more directly now to counter the support for Hamas in the West Bank, which has reportedly grown since 10/7. Today, the New York Times reports that Iran is now directly smuggling weapons to militants in the West Bank, which constitutes a direct challenge to the PA’s already weak authority in the region. If the PA’s hold on the West Bank is further weakened (and forces aligned with Iran are ascendant), it’s hard to imagine the PA then successfully governing Gaza.
  • Iran’s drone tech innovations could create a formidable arms dealer. Restricted by over 40 years of sanctions, Tehran has honed its creative tactics and techniques for building and deploying UAVs and other weaponry. There are growing concerns among defense and intelligence analysts that Iran’s weaponry has become significantly more sophisticated over the last six years. Just within the past six months, several prominent incidents attributed to Iran or its proxies have threatened the security of US ground forces and our allies (e.g., the drone attack on the Tower 22 US military base in Jordan and the surprising tactical capacity of Houthis in disrupting Red Sea shipping). Further, even under US sanctions, Iran has scavenged and used elaborate strings of front companies to procure weapons parts. At least six US indictments have been filed or unsealed since 2020, alleging that Iran attempted to launder US-made weapons parts through third-country businesses. In doing so, Iran can aid allies and proxies in producing drones on their territory, giving Tehran plausible deniability for how the weapons are being assembled and deployed.

Israel-Gaza

  • Ceasefire talks remain deadlocked in Cairo, while Netanyahu has set a date for his Rafah offensive. Talks in Cairo began again on Sunday with CIA Director Bill Burns in attendance, signaling the United States’ continued efforts to push both sides towards an agreement. Despite public statements from Hamas and Israeli representatives that the deal remains stalled, White House spokespeople are, at least publicly, affirming that a hostage deal and six-week ceasefire are still possible. It appears, however, that little progress has been made since the most recent failed round of negotiations in Doha. Hamas and Israel to date do not appear to be backing down on their main demands. 
  • Israel withdrew all but one brigade of troops from Gaza this weekend. Effectively, the IDF no longer has ground forces in the southern Gaza Strip. The move signals a momentary pause in fighting. In recent days, the Biden Administration has been more vocal in pushing back on Netanyahu’s military strategy and calling for an end to operations and a full-fledged deal for the hostages. Last week’s tragic killing of seven aid workers brought intense pressure on Israel to remove the obstacles to distributing aid and reevaluate its military activities, lest it lose international backing. Publicly, however, Netanyahu’s posture has not changed and he remains committed to eliminating Hamas in Gaza. 
  • Turkey imposed trade restrictions on Israel Tuesday morning until a ceasefire is reached. Ankara will cease importing 54 Israeli products, including cement, steel, and iron construction materials. This comes after Israel rejected Turkey’s request to participate in an aid airdrop in Gaza last week. Israel’s Foreign Minister responded by ordering the Economic Division of his ministry to prepare a list of Turkish products to be sanctioned and issued an appeal to pro-Israel countries and organizations in the US to halt investments in and imports from Turkey. The two countries normalized relations in 2022, but the war in Gaza has caused notable strain on the tenuous relationship. Before October 7th, Tel Aviv and Ankara were working to increase cooperation in energy and trade after a decade of tensions. Moreover, Turkish President Erdogan may use popular dissatisfaction with the Israel relationship as a means to regain domestic political support, following last week’s electoral defeat. 

International Affairs

  • US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned China that the US will not allow new industries to be decimated by Chinese imports. This comes after a six-day series of meetings in Beijing to discuss excess industrial capacity and macroeconomic ties between Washington and Beijing. In particular, Secretary Yellen spoke of safeguarding electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and solar industries. Due to their domestic policies, these products are often manufactured much cheaper than in the US, threatening US suppliers. China’s commerce minister has flatly denied that China oversupplies the US, indicating some level of strife on this point still exists between the two sides. Despite this, Yellen claimed that US-China relations were in a stronger position than this time last year. 

Election Tampering

  • Elon Musk faces a legal investigation in Brazil for alleged election tampering and widespread disinformation on his social media platform, X (formerly Twitter). Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes issued an order for Musk to block several users on X as part of the investigation into former president Jair Bolsonaro’s attempts to stay in power after his 2022 election defeat. This week, Musk decided to reverse those account bans and called for the impeachment of Justice Moraes, who subsequently opened an inquiry into Musk for obstruction of justice, backed by Brazil’s current president Lula da Silva. Moraes is also leading an investigation into executives at Telegram and Google for their role in a campaign criticizing internet regulation in Brazil. Musk claims the Brazilian courts and the administration have been using the investigation to aggressively clamp down on free speech, a claim that has been leveled against Moraes by many on Brazil’s right and by Bolsonaro’s supporters. He has yet to address the latest developments on X but has encouraged X users in Brazil to override judicial bans on X with a VPN.

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