Key Takeaways from the Doha attack

On September 9th the Israeli Air Force targeted Hamas’s political leadership in Doha, Qatar with an air-launched ballistic missile strike. Four factors made this strike significant:

1. It broke an unwritten rule against attacking targets inside Qatar. (More on this below, but Iran technically broke this rule first with their June attack on the US air base at Al Udeid.)
2. The Trump administration claims it was not consulted on the strike and was only notified at a point where the attack could not be stopped. (Israeli sources dispute this account.)
3. It targeted a meeting of the precise group of Hamas political leadership responsible for ceasefire negotiations. The strike effectively ended the current round of negotiations and virtually guaranteed Israel would move ahead with its reinvasion of Gaza City. 
4. It failed. Hamas’s senior political leadership survived. Israel may argue that it made some strategic gain via this strike, but as of now no such gain is clear.

As the dust settles on the Doha strike, Interfor sees a few critical takeaways for the future of the region and global geopolitics more broadly.

Norm Breaking Matters

Three months ago, Interfor explicitly warned a Gulf-based client that Israel would likely attempt to assassinate Qatar-based Hamas political leadership in the next six months. While this in part drew on insight from our sources in Israel, it was first and foremost based on our analysis of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s increasingly cynical view of normative constraints around Israeli foreign and defense policy.

Over the past two years, Netanyahu has shown a willingness to go beyond what much of the world sees as appropriate or proportionate military action against Israel’s adversaries. Despite his disregard for the international perspective, however, Netanyahu still typically offers a normative rationale for bold military action. In other words, while Netanyahu does not personally feel constrained by global norms, he knows exactly where the lines are drawn and navigates them very intentionally.

This past June’s 12-day war between Iran and Israel concluded with Iran’s missile strike on the US air base at Al Udeid in Qatar. Despite limited damage, this attack still partially ruptured the global perception that military action inside Qatar was off limits. 

From Interfor’s perspective, the second Iran launched missiles over Doha, Israeli kinetic action against Hamas inside Qatar was all but guaranteed. While Iran’s attack did not materially change Qatar’s status as a major non-NATO US ally, it gave Netanyahu the cover he needed to justify a one-off strike. 

This dynamic is increasingly at play not just in the Middle East but globally. Putin, in particular, has pioneered the tactic of testing global norms, in essence: “Does anything actually happen if I step over this imaginary red line?”

Much Hinges on Trump-Netanyahu Relationship 

Since the beginning of Trump’s current term, Interfor has looked at the tone of his relationship with Netanyahu as a critical factor that will drive the Middle East’s near and medium-term future. While both leaders publicly offer each other political support, they still clash on a personal level.

Trump has given Netanyahu a long leash when it comes to Gaza, Iran, Syria, and other issues. He has also tried and failed to constrain Netanyahu’s actions across all of those geographies. Netanyahu often feeds off Trump’s offhand comments, using them to justify more aggressive Israeli policies.

• Trump’s remarks about owning and developing Gaza, even if it means displacing the local population, gave Netanyahu space to explicitly advocate for aggressive military options.
• Then in August, after months of the US and Israel pushing for a temporary ceasefire, Trump voiced a sudden preference for a comprehensive, war-ending agreement, which enabled Netanyahu to walk away from advanced discussions targeting a 60-day ceasefire.

Following the Doha strike, we will likely see increased US-Gulf cooperation – like the proposed new US-Qatar security agreement – and Trump administration officials leaking critical remarks about Netanyahu to the press. It remains unlikely that Trump will reduce material support for Israel, but we may see his team meeting less with Netanyahu and more with other Israeli officials.

Gulf States to Hedge, Given Reduced Faith in US

Lastly, even if the US signs a new security agreement with Qatar, the GCC’s faith in the US security guarantee has weakened. We have already seen the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar come closer together following last week’s Doha strike, and each of the three will likely flirt with enhanced ties to China and Russia.

Trump’s hopes for advancing the Abraham Accords are also dwindling. Normalization with the Saudis – the largest diplomatic prize Israel could hope for in this context – is indefinitely postponed. The Emiratis have threatened to cut back on their recently normalized ties to Israel if the Jewish state moves forward with annexations of territory in the West Bank. Notably, that Emirati threat came before the Israeli strike on Doha; tensions are now even higher. Trump’s team could push normalization between Israel and other countries, e.g. in Central Asia, but progress within the Arab world is almost certainly on hold.

Still, ever closer ties to the US will remain all three states’ first choice. Much depends on Trump’s willingness and capacity to constrain Israel. If Trump chooses to exercise some control over – or lean away from – Netanyahu, the Gulf States will offer enhanced ties and investment in return. But further White House endorsement of expanded military action in Gaza, annexation in the West Bank, and/or more Israeli strikes in Iran could push the Gulf to invest in other alliances. 

As of now, the latter course appears more likely. Trump’s team appears eager to move past the Doha strike and hopes it can reassure the Gulf States without reprimanding Israel. The White House, however, may be underestimating Gulf anger and could see its agenda in the region struggle with less emphatic Gulf support.