NATO’s real test may come after the summit ends

As NATO leaders left Ankara this week, there were a lot of polite declarations that the alliance is strong, united and prepared for whatever comes next. The real question is whether Vladimir Putin believes them.

That question hangs over this year’s NATO summit more than any single dispute over defense spending, Ukraine aid, or diplomatic protocol. Russia does not need to defeat NATO militarily to weaken it. It only needs to convince itself that a carefully calibrated provocation could divide the alliance and raise doubts about whether Article 5 — the commitment that an attack on one member is an attack on all — would be decisively invoked.

That is the scenario NATO should be most worried about. Not necessarily a full-scale Russian invasion of Poland or the Baltic states, but something murkier: a cyberattack on critical infrastructure, sabotage against transportation networks, interference with energy systems, a violent border incident, or a covert operation designed to look deniable long enough to create political hesitation.

For businesses operating in Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, this is not an abstract security debate. These countries sit on NATO’s eastern flank and have become increasingly important to logistics, technology, manufacturing, energy, and finance. A crisis short of war could still disrupt travel, banking, communications, ports, rail lines, insurance markets and employee safety. Companies with exposure in the region should be reviewing evacuation plans, communications redundancy, cyber resilience, supply-chain alternatives and decision-making protocols now — not after a provocation occurs.

The summit’s defense spending debate matters because it speaks directly to credibility. NATO allies have spent years arguing over whether members are meeting their obligations. Those arguments are no longer merely about fairness to American taxpayers. They are about whether NATO can persuade Moscow that Europe has the will and capacity to defend itself. The alliance’s newer spending targets may help, but only if they translate into usable capabilities: air defense, drone production, logistics, intelligence, cyber defense and rapid reinforcement of the eastern flank.

Spain illustrates the problem. Madrid has already been at odds with Washington over defense spending. But the more revealing dispute came during the Iran conflict, when Spain refused to allow the United States to use Spanish bases and airspace. The episode demonstrated an uncomfortable reality: NATO members may be allies, but they will not always support U.S. military action outside the Article 5 framework. That distinction matters because adversaries study alliance politics closely. They look for seams, caveats and hesitation.

Turkey presents another test of alliance management. Reports that Washington may reconsider the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Ankara have raised concerns about the regional balance of power. Yet Turkey is also a crucial NATO member, controlling access to the Black Sea and occupying a central position between Europe, Russia and the Middle East. Strengthening Turkey’s role in NATO may make strategic sense, but doing so requires managing consequences far beyond the alliance itself.

Then there is Greenland. There is real concern about the Arctic – in particular on critical minerals and sea lanes. But Trump’s imperious demand to control the territory is clearly about his own ego and desire to buttress his legacy. The issue has conjured the unthinkable idea of NATO allies engaged in a shooting war and has deeply eroded trust within the alliance. As Russia and China increase their interest in the High North, NATO cannot afford internal friction to distract from the region’s strategic importance.

These disputes do not mean NATO is collapsing. But they do show that unity is not automatic. It must be maintained, resourced and demonstrated before a crisis, not improvised during one.

That is especially true because Russia’s most likely test may be designed to avoid clarity. A conventional invasion would almost certainly unify NATO. A deniable attack, cyber operation or limited incident near the Suwałki Gap might do something more dangerous: force allies into a debate over evidence, proportionality and escalation while markets panic and companies scramble.

For corporate leaders, the lesson is straightforward. Geopolitical risk in Europe is no longer limited to sanctions on Russia, energy prices, or the war in Ukraine. It includes the possibility that NATO’s eastern flank becomes the stage for a deliberate test of Western resolve.

Businesses with employees, facilities, vendors or clients in Poland and the Baltic states should treat this moment as a prompt for serious planning. Who decides whether to relocate staff? How will employees communicate if networks are disrupted? Are local managers empowered to act quickly? Are supply chains dependent on a single border crossing, port or rail route? Have executives considered how a crisis would affect insurance, contracts, data security and reputational risk?

NATO summits are designed to project confidence. That is useful, but confidence is not the same as preparedness. The alliance must convince Russia that Article 5 is not merely a treaty provision but a political reality. Businesses should draw the same conclusion: deterrence is strongest when preparation is visible before the test arrives.

The most dangerous scenario is not that NATO fails to understand the Russian threat. It is that Russia misunderstands NATO’s willingness to respond. In that gap between perception and reality, a provocation could become a crisis. And by then, governments will not be the only ones under pressure to act.