The Iran Conflict: Beyond the Headlines 

In the aftermath of a series of attacks by Israel and the U.S. on Iran, questions remain about whether or not the strikes have altered Iran’s nuclear prospects. Has the damage been as significant as the U.S. and Israel are claiming? Is the conflict really over? What’s next for the region? Interfor International’s Geopolitics team offers insights into this complex story. 

How much damage did the U.S. and Israeli strikes actually do to Iran’s nuclear program?

Our assessment is that Iran’s ability to enrich uranium from scratch — especially at scale — is significantly diminished, if not destroyed. However, two key points here:

1. Iran likely moved at least some of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) prior to the U.S. strikes on Fordow and Natanz. Iran’s ~450kg of 60% enriched uranium was enough for 10 bombs, and even with just a few operational centrifuges (<10) Iran could theoretically enrich a portion of that stockpile to weapons grade (90%) in a matter of weeks.

2.            The IAEA has already assessed that Iran could rebuild an enrichment capability, albeit likely a smaller one, within a few months. Whether or not any of Iran’s preexisting centrifuges survived the strikes, Iran could opt to rebuild enough capacity to revive its negotiating leverage somewhat quickly.

Still, reports suggest Israel is closely monitoring the status of Iran’s HEU stockpile and what remains of the broader nuclear program. If compelling Israeli intelligence suggests Iran is moving toward a nuclear weapon, we could see further Israeli strikes (and an end to the ceasefire).

If the nuclear threat is reduced but not eliminated, what’s the next phase of this conflict?

In terms of Israeli and/or U.S. operations targeting Iran’s nuclear program, we don’t see an immediate next phase of the conflict. The Trump administration wants to allow space for diplomacy to progress. Still, Israel will likely lobby Trump to take a more aggressive stance on what constitutes a “good deal” on Iran’s nuclear program and, potentially, to re-engage militarily (or allow Israel to do so on their behalf). 

At this point, we’d put further large-scale military strikes on Iran at 30-40%. That aside, there’s a much higher chance – as high as 80-90% that Israel continues to covertly target the program, in the event Iran reinvests in its nuclear capability. 

The larger issue here is about politics: Iran’s political will to move forward or back down and Trump’s commitment to diplomacy vs. yielding to Israeli wishes. 

• Iranian decision making depends on opaque dynamics inside the Islamic Republic’s leadership structure. Many are speculating Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could step down or be pushed aside to facilitate a policy shift and an end to the conflict, but it remains hard to estimate the probability of such a change. 
• Talks between the U.S. and Iran, given their technical nature, are unlikely to offer a “quick fix.” If these talks drag on, Israel will aim to persuade the U.S. that Iran is stalling and advocate for a military alternative.
• Lastly, we are dealing with three heads of state with major domestic constituency concerns. Khamenei and Netanyahu, more than Trump, feel the frequent need to throw “red meat” to their base, in the form of antagonizing geopolitical adversaries. On the other hand, Trump is highly sensitive to foreign leaders’ remarks and could feasibly call off nuclear talks if offended by Khamenei’s latest diatribe against the U.S. Trump could also swing the other way if he feels Netanyahu is being disingenuous with him regarding the Iran situation. This dynamic creates a whole new array of complex and hard to predict possibilities.

What does this mean for U.S.-Israel cooperation? Are they aligned going forward?

The U.S. is eager for a diplomatic victory in a deal with Iran. As we discussed previously, an end to Fordow followed by a ceasefire is a clean political sequence for Trump to put his name on. Meanwhile, Israel wants the Iranian threat fully eliminated and is eager to continue striking to accomplish this. This creates a tension that Iran may seek to exploit.

Iran could work productively (though slowly) with the U.S. during ongoing nuclear negotiations and issue positive statements about Trump’s team, while taking actions that could be interpreted as efforts to reestablish the nuclear program or proxy assets. Such a strategy could exacerbate tension between Trump and Netanyahu who do, in fact, seem to have different interests here: Trump wants to make headlines with a deal, and Netanyahu wants zero security threat from Iran.

What’s the wider impact on Middle East diplomacy? Could this conflict reshape alignments?

Iran directly targeting Qatar, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is a big deal. It could bring Qatar closer to its neighbors, the UAE and KSA, following years of rivalry and dispute and theoretically soften the ground for an expansion of the Abraham Accords. However, Saudi Arabia is next up on Trump’s list for normalization with Israel, and given public perception of Israel in the Arab world amid the war in Gaza, we don’t see the Saudis moving on this imminently. 

There’s also speculation about Syria or even Lebanon inching toward some sort of cooperation with Israel. A weaker Iran makes those types of deals somewhat more likely as well.

How does Turkey fit into all of this?

Turkey was notably sidelined in this round of the conflict mediation, but they’re not sitting idle. Erdogan wants to be a major regional power. To the extent military might is a means of establishing regional influence, Erdogan just saw Iran’s missile deterrent and air defenses overwhelmed by Israeli airpower. We expect the Turkish military to invest heavily in offensive and defensive technology to enhance deterrence and air defense.

A weakened Iran might otherwise benefit Turkey’s regional ambitions – think of conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh, where Iran and Turkey back opposing forces. 

Perhaps most importantly, Turkey and Iran both also host large Kurdish populations. While Turkey has been negotiating an end to a decades-long conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Iran has been cracking down on Kurds in its own territory. Amid Israel’s intelligence success in support of its recent attacks in Iran, the Iranian regime has arrested a large number of Kurds and accused them of collaborating with Israel. 

This dynamic could theoretically create a situation where Iran’s Kurds pursue a larger armed struggle against the Islamic Republic and/or where Israel seeks to leverage the Turkey-based PKK as a proxy against Iran. Either case would mean reinvigorated Kurdish militancy in the broader region, which could derail Turkey’s PKK peace process, or even bring them to align with Iran against the Kurds.

To what extent has this conflict broken assumed norms for the region and what impact could that have?

Iran’s decision to launch direct attacks against Qatar shattered a longstanding assumption — that large-scale state-led armed conflict in the GCC was virtually impossible. 

This could effect a psychological shift in the active global business community in the Gulf. Investors and foreign firms operating in places like Dubai or Doha may start to question how immune they really are to regional conflict.

As Iran breaks norms, other countries will take note. The U.S. had previously held Israel back from targeting Hamas’ political leadership in Qatar, for example, but now that Iranian missiles have soared over Doha, diplomacy is harder to defend.